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Abstract: In "The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology" 
Javier Gálvez discusses a very specific aspect within the work of Foucault: the role of the philosophies 
of history in the composition of historical discourse. The philosophies of history of pre-revolutionary 
Europe were able to show a discursive continuity that does not tally with the discontinuities that are 
sought in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical project. The question that is asked following the 
analyses of these discourses does not fully escape from the analyses of the knowledge-power 
apparatuses: how is it possible that the practical-political nature of the philosophy of history discourses 
has remained effectively silenced in political practice? After elucidating a barely bounded concept of 
“history” in Foucault from the discontinuities of the epistemological fields of “Order” and “History,” the 
indecision of this rupture in philosophical-historical discourse will be shown, taking Turgot and Vico as 
examples.       
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Javier Gálvez AGUIRRE  
 
The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology 
 
If one must speak of History with a capital “H,” this should be the History of Humanity, the History of 
events, the narration of singularities that enable the making of a certain story. And insofar as History 
can be studied, it also requires certain standards, a method, the suspicion that History and its 
singularities can also indicate regularities. Since The Order of Things, Foucault has expressed the 
interests and problems typical of undertaking any type of research concerning history. And the problem 
is exacerbated when imposing the obligation of examining it by means of an archaeological method: 
history is no longer only a temporal flow; this flow is always accompanied by a certain tinge of 
knowledge, a certain conception about this very history that prevents it from being thought as if there 
were once a pure object. Nevertheless, history, as temporality, continues to indicate, from its 
paradoxical position, the impulse to escape from the order of a certain knowledge. Precisely when we 
try to understand history from within a particular epochal frame, specifically that which emerges out of 
an interest in the very historicity of mankind, that is when the distinction between History and the 
human sciences is made more obvious. Hence it should be stated: History, in The Order of Things, 
cannot be included just like that as one of the human sciences. Foucault examines the question in 
relation to modern discourse, a discourse that aims to be dissolved in objectivity, and one to which we 
are still partly captive: due to the fact of having made history of the world (natural history, economic 
history, history of language), mankind himself becomes dehistoricized. But in this process, on setting 
out to find the time of things, man realizes that History concerns man exclusively, the man that 
designates, classifies and understands the history of things: 
 
At a very deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the radical 
dispersion that provides a foundation for all other histories. It was just this primary erosion that the nineteenth 
century sought in its concern to historicize everything, to write a general history of everything, to go back 
ceaselessly through time, and to place the most stable of things in the liberating stream of time. Here again, 
we should no doubt revise the way in which we traditionally write the history of History. (Foucault, The Order 
403) 
 
 From the nineteenth century onwards, interest in the human being and his history has been objectified 
from a paradoxical position: the particularity and relativity of actions are understood in a temporal 
frame, but at the same time this relativity is gradually eroded for the sake of explanatory regularity. 
This is a question of a feedback process: the regularities typical of a historical a priori from the classical 
period have lost their own specific field of enunciation. And what was typical of the classical period in 
terms of History? The study of regularities that are present in the objects that are analyzed. History, in 
the framework of the classical episteme, is Order. And it would have appeared to be that simple, if 
Foucault himself had not given the 1975-1976 Collège de France lectures. In these lectures, published 
under the title Society Must Be Defended, Foucault proposes analyzing the genealogy of the discourses 
on racism. This text, which does not tend to be highly cited by the specialist literature (when compared 
to others such as Birth of Biopolitics or Security, Territory, Population), provides the keys, as I 
understand it, to making another reading of Foucault possible, in which the dialogue with the tradition 
of the history of thought is more open. It is a text, ultimately, where the topic under discussion could 
also be the direct object of the history of ideas (in the sense meant by Foucault). The purpose of these 
lectures is to undertake an archaeological analysis of the narratives, of the (hi)stories on History up 
until the end of the eighteenth century. The culmination is the reabsorption of these narratives within 
the philosophy of bourgeois history, of that bourgeoisie that boasts about the vocabulary of Progress. 
It is not, therefore, a question of the praise of such absorption but the confirmation of a process of 
crystallization of certain discourses.  
Despite this assessment, the typical assertions of the philosophy of history are not the central points 
of the text. The critiques of a certain disciplinary notion of History are the constant background noise 
against which the author operates. From the methodological delimitations that are proposed in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (to demarcate the elements of construction of knowledge) to the contrasting 
of the histories that he presents in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault delineates a conception of the 
least grandiloquent history, the least prone to closed systemizations and to all those characteristic 
products of an onto-theology (also in this case, teleological) that disregard the material practices of 
knowledge within which they operate. The objective is the positive establishment of (a) a series of lines 
of investigation for our present self-understanding, (b) alternative routes in the political construction of 
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ourselves. Insofar as he sets outs an alternative model of interpretation of History in toto, Foucault 
barely provides any indications about the future. This is not, otherwise, surprising: distancing oneself 
from all traditional metaphysical construction of History becomes synonymous with getting rid of the 
whole historical-philosophical lexicon. And this implies undermining History as such (that History with a 
capital “H,” lineal, with inexorable tendencies toward the western civilizing model), not offering prophetic 
glimmers of future hope, distrusting any anthropological projection based on technique and its 
(allegedly) finalistic advance. The propaedeutics of Foucault in this regard, it is worth highlighting, 
consist of the exposition of proto-knowledge that does not reach the disciplinary level of the most well-
known. Or, in the best of cases, a proto-knowledge that was reabsorbed into a disciplinary logic that 
radically modulated it. In short, it is a question of burnishing certain other discourses that have been 
silenced. However, this does not give them a kind of superior “moral ranking” to the predominant 
discourses because they are not necessarily a type of voice of the oppressed (Foucault, Society 76). It 
is only of use to us as an indication for undertaking a more complex critical ontology, more befitting the 
realities that are presented to us, albeit in a latent way, in the discourses that have remained partially 
crystallized down to the current day. 
With this condensed explanation, I have shown a possible exegetic path of the relation between the 
Foucauldian task and the critique of the philosophies of history, particularly those that emerged between 
the end of the eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. In the degree to which the 
archaeological reading of historical knowledge (Natural History, Economics, Anthropology) opens up a 
breach at the heart of modern History, the philosophical constructions on History enter a critical 
situation: there is no question of speaking of teleology, or of truth in History, or of unidirectional lineality, 
or of laws in its movement, or of Progress. All construction on History of a philosophical nature has been 
gigantomachy, a meta-story that should be called into question due to its tendency to establish a 
dialectic between History and Knowledge that ideologically distorts all bourgeois action, all modern 
sovereign power, in a desire for universality. Thus, critiquing the modern construction of history does 
not imply eradicating the possibility of establishing a rational and critical investigation of its very history, 
of its very construction (Paponi 26).  
Insofar as narrative constructions of events aim to have a status of “knowing,” of “conceptual 
seriousness,” the focus of the question will be politicized. The narrative will go from being “literature of 
leisure” or “indicator of moral behavior” to being the source of legitimization of certain political demands. 
It is these narratives that trace the history of races in Society Must Be Defended. What is peculiar about 
these lectures is that they were able to trace the particular outline of the gap that Foucault knowingly 
left without mention in The Archaeology of Knowledge: the relation between the forms of narrative 
discourse and the forms of social and cultural production. Due to the fact that it traced a narrative in 
opposition to the official history of the statesmen of the State, it opened the path toward investigating 
the relations between theory and practice in a space that was close to the question of ideology. Although 
one must bear in mind that it makes no sense to assume two completely separated blocks, one “real” 
and the other “social” in the construction of discourses (Chartier 176). The space of these narratives 
takes place alongside the appearance of the philosophies of history of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. What is curious is that these philosophies of history, which played such a central role in their 
time, lose their focus here: the interest in other, lesser knowledge thus functions as a kind of silent 
critique. What is missing, therefore, is the explicit counterpoint of both types of discourse. No discourse 
whatsoever states the explicit truth for us. Its relevance resides in two other aspects: (1) its legitimizing 
aspect of certain social strata, of certain modes of life; (2) its function as “attractor” and social mobilizer. 
The two aspects diverge if the receivers of the message do not hold the position “narrated” in its status 
quo. The discourse can go from being revolutionary to conservative depending on the social actors that 
verbalize it. It thus surreptitiously enters into the tricky terrain of the ideological function of the 
discourse. But has the ideology really been satisfactorily delineated through these types of discourse? 
How do we understand, first of all, the relation between text and action through the archaeological 
analyses of politics and history? 
The particular line of research of this paper points to a comparative study that has not been overtly 
confronted by Foucault: the place of “History’s” composition in the narratives of the history of races (as 
its subsequent reabsorption into a “statized” historiography) and in the philosophies of the history of 
the period. A more orthodox line of research would require having, as its touchstone, the development 
of the question of governmentality always present, outlined particularly in Birth of Biopolitics. If this 
governmentality does not have an ahistorical tenor, then it must be in line with the liberal conception 
that appears in the eighteenth century. This is, in other words, the “result” of Foucault’s archaeological 
research that remains after breaking with any historical continuity idealized in Modernity. Because of 
this he moves on to the question of conduct (Lorenzini 9) and turns to the care of self, studied in the 
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lectures he gave in his later years. This is how Foucault chose to account for the relation between text 
and action. But in this work the analysis pauses at an earlier point to make it possible to examine 
another possible way, another possible reading of the relation between politics and discourse. For 
Foucault himself had realized that his project of the destruction of the subject, typical of the 1960s, was 
going to be impossible. What remained was for him to mine it via a genealogical work from various 
angles and without a solution of continuity (Potte-Bonneville 165). The reading concerning the concepts 
obtained through genealogical analysis in the Collège de France lectures can be interpreted as yet 
another discourse (and which has not always succeeded in expounding the totalities desired). Posing 
this question does not compel reabsorbing the Foucauldian project into the universalizing tendency of 
the history of (political) ideas. Rather, it is a question of introducing the elements of the history of ideas 
into the heterogeneity of the histories narrated (Revel, “Foucault” 24), of obliging the hegemonic 
elements to be one more part of the dialogue, although by doing so certain aspects of “otherness” are 
blurred, which today run the risk of being equally distorted. It is therefore a question of widening the 
problem of “History” from the inclusion of strictly philosophical discourses: must all the “triumphal” 
discourses remain irremissibly outside of archaeological analysis? If the answer is no, the question of 
the relation between the discursive construction of History and the danger of the text’s idealization 
would remain open. 
In order to tackle the proposed task, the relation between history (as official discourse) and the 
composition of the philosophies of history from the end of the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries 
needs to be understood with greater clarity, and certain essential aspects of Society Must Be Defended 
need to be scrutinized. In these lectures, Foucault focuses on the genealogy of the history of races. This 
is characterized by countering the official State discourse, and thus in turn it also counters the very 
discourses of political philosophy. The central slogan of all counter-history (Foucault focuses on the 
cases of England and France) is an inversion of Clausewitz’s famous phrase: war is not the continuation 
of politics, but politics is the continuation of war. Through the narrative of certain historical myths, 
counter-history aims to show the unjust impositions of the State against barbarian origins. The barbarian 
is thus vindicated compared to the administrative political model and imperialist tendencies (Foucault, 
Society 103, 112). Nonetheless, it should be stated that there are two discontinuous levels in this 
counter-history (Gros 83):  
1) the English narrative, focused on the reinstatement of primitive law;   
2) the French narrative, which aims to legitimize the right of force of the nobles, who were losing 
their privileges with the politics of the centralization of power typical of absolute monarchy.   
The context that I am interested in analyzing is the latter: following the course of French counter-
history, it culminates in the very legitimization of the philosophies of the history of the nineteenth 
century. What is characteristic of this counter-history is that, in contrast to pacifying discourses, it 
observes the survival of the conflict in the heart of political coexistence. All peace is nothing but an 
illusion that aims to keep the State and its defenders alive. But if politics is the continuation of war, the 
structure of the social body loses the rigidity it yearns for. The opening and survival of the conflict are 
due to two issues: “One was the problem of whether or not the war between hostile groups really does 
constitute the substructure of the State; the other was the problem of whether political power can be 
regarded both as a product of that war and, up to a point, its referee, or whether it is usually a tool, the 
beneficiary of, and the destabilizing, partisan element in that war” (Foucault, Society 127). If the conflict 
exists and there is insistence on its being a part of the discourses of counter-history, this is due to the 
nobility’s interest in thinking of their rights outside of the law, in the interstices of the law. It is no longer 
the State speaking, nor its scholars who aim to legitimize it – and who, moreover, had been losing their 
credibility throughout the eighteenth century (Grell 26-27). What begins to speak now is society or, 
rather, the nation. With the object “nation” a discursive rift will be opened. On the one hand, nation is 
not comprehended within a territory defined by the reach of the legal power of the State. All legal-
political ritualism (ritual of legitimization that is covered between the political-theological apparatuses 
of Roman Law and the monarchic vicariate of mediaeval Christianity) will be confronted, and reviled, by 
a history of humiliation and the desire for restitution, both legal and moral. Counter-history thus rises 
up as a revolutionary and critical element of the status quo: 
 
This is also a knowledge whose methodology is not the ritual reactivation of the acts that founded power, but 
the systematic interpretation of its evil intentions and the recollection of everything that it has systematically 
forgotten. Its method is the perpetual denunciation of the evil that has been done in history. This is no longer 
the glorious history of power; it is the history of its lower depths, its wickedness, and its betrayals. (Foucault, 
Society 135) 
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 Thus counter-history will take an eminently critical tone, and with it, will make it possible to lay 
down the bases of all revolutionary political discourse. What happens over the eighteenth century, 
however, is that the bourgeois discourse, by appropriating the critique and the moral tone in its 
philosophical-historical reflections, it will displace the issue of the conflict to a margin that will end up 
pacifying this counter-knowledge. It is the very embourgeoisement that causes this self-
dialecticalization, and not a kind of reflection from the history of ideas (Foucault, Society 216). Counter-
history opposes the State with the nation, and now, little by little, the State will absorb the concept of 
nation and smooth over the internal conflicts. The history that countered the State opposed political 
theory and any philosophical aim to explain and pacify the conflict. But from the mid-eighteenth century, 
when the bourgeoisie also appropriated the discourse of history, this discourse would diminish the 
conflictive aspect in their narrative picture: just like in the political philosophy of Hobbes or Puffendorf, 
war would be an aside in the flow of History, just one point more, with barely a role when the desired 
political objectives are achieved.  
The conceptual displacement of the conflict in the discourses on history can be appreciated with 
clarity in the discontinuity that is drawn from the writings of Boulainvilliers to those of Sieyès. It is a 
displacement that operates by bourgeois self-understanding itself, which looks at History seeking to 
make itself nation. The difference with the discourse of the nobility stems from the fact that while the 
latter formulated itself as a group hostile to the monarch, the bourgeois nation, the Third State, saw 
itself as a nation insofar as it aspired to legitimately represent the conjunction of State and Nation: 
“What characterizes "the" nation is not a horizontal relationship with other groups (such as other nations, 
hostile or enemy nations, or the nations with which it is juxtaposed). What does characterize the nation 
is, in contrast, a vertical relationship between a body of individuals who are capable of constituting a 
State, and the actual existence of the State itself” (Foucault, Society 223). A nation that aspires to be 
State is compelled to rewrite all conflict as one more element in the historical discourse. Conflict must 
not be always present, it must be resolved in some way when it finally reaches a legitimate State model 
(that which had “always” held a true nation). The specific mode of the bourgeoisie of registering that 
conflict in the historical discourse is through reconciliation. The conflict has certainly existed, and it has 
made the shifting of governmental models possible. But that conflict must disappear in society, and it 
does so by generating, before its last moment of splendor, the legal and cultural models of co-existence. 
As the conflict becomes displaced, what is relevant in these discourses is not centered on their legacy. 
The focus of attention is, from now on, the discourse of State control. And to that must be added another 
differentiating element: the historical discourse of the bourgeoisie will not demand their rights from their 
origin but from the legitimization of their present, from the possibility of making real the virtuality of 
the nation: “Once history is polarized around the nation/State, virtuality / actuality, functional totality 
of the nation/real universality of the State, you can see clearly that the present becomes the fullest 
moment, the moment of the greatest intensity, the solemn moment when the universal makes its entry 
into the real” (Foucault, Society 227). This genealogical delineation finally makes visible the relation 
between counter-history, history as disciplinary knowledge (monarchic state and, later and with other 
characters, bourgeois state) and philosophical-historical discourse. Bearing in mind that the relation 
between these different types of discourse must assume the discontinuities and disparities of every 
order of the discourse, at least three questions arise:    
(1) Would Foucault perhaps adopt a Marxist notion of functionally operative ideology in his analyses? 
The relation between the discursive conditions and the material conditions, clear in the genealogical 
analysis of history, goes one step beyond the archaeological project: it supposes a level of connection 
between both conditions that Foucault himself had deliberately set aside in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge.  
(2) Is the conflictive and violent outline of the discourse of the counter-history of origins lost completely? 
We will need to examine what the construct of society is that is made possible with the concept of 
nation, especially if the question is contemplated based on the subsequent lectures (Security, Territory, 
Population and Birth of Biopolitics). 
(3) What happens with the pre-revolutionary philosophical-historical discourses? These have remained 
partially obliterated when characterizing the dialectic drift of the philosophy of bourgeois history.  
These three questions will be answered in different ways in the remainder of this study. I will try to 
answer the first over the rest of the discussion, although I fear that I will not be able to offer a fully 
satisfactory answer. The second cannot be reliably answered in this article due to issues of space and 
succinctness of argument. The third I will answer forthwith.    
We have seen that the genealogical discourse on history passes exactly through counter-history and 
through its susceptibility to being politically appropriated. What has been left aside in this counter-
history is the appearance of the philosophies of history from the mid-eighteenth century (Vico, 
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Montesquieu, Turgot, Voltaire). Are they not susceptible to an analysis of the formations of the 
discourse? Why is Turgot, both philosopher and economist and minister, barely mentioned in this 
genealogy of power? Why is Vico reduced to a cyclical explanation of history that has little to do with 
his historical project through the fantastic universals? The question that is raised is not to refute the 
significance of Foucault’s analyses, but to broaden the spectrum and thus in turn demythologize the 
position of the history of ideas. Nonetheless, to the extent that Foucault disregards these authors, a gap 
appears in his own discourse about History: when History is analyzed through the discourses of 
philosophers, it is not limited to offering the conditions of understanding of the historicism of the 
nineteenth century. This History as episteme was only half-finished in the mid-eighteenth century, as 
the philosophical-historical discourses of that time were not limited to the explicit specification of the 
conditions of the episteme “Order.” Examining the philosophical-historical discourses, what we find, 
therefore, is that the great break has, unfortunately, a middle ground: the attempt at reconciliation 
between Order and History. I call into doubt the discontinuity between these two episteme models using 
two brief references to relevant authors within the European context of that time: Anne Robert Jacques 
Turgot and Giambattista Vico.  
“History gives place to analogical organic structures, just as Order opened the way to successive 
identities and differences” (Foucault, The order 237). According to this quotation, the possibility of 
uniting elements of analogy and succession lacks sense, as we find ourselves with two divergent 
epistemic frameworks, without a solution of continuity in the production conditions of its enunciations. 
This discontinuity is demonstrated by the radical difference of focus between the political discourses of 
the seventeenth-century philosophers, the history of the nobility in the style of Boulainvilliers and 
Sieyès’s characterization of the Third Estate. But between Boulainvilliers and Sieyès lies Turgot, a clear 
example of philosophical-historical practice. I move on with a quotation from one of his texts about 
Universal History “Le genre humain toujours le même dans ses bouleversements, comme l'eau de la 
mer dans les tempêtes, et marchant toujours à sa perfection” (“The human race always remaining the 
same during these upheavals, like the water of the sea during storms, and always proceeding toward 
its perfection”) (276-77). Is this merely a question of successions? Perhaps the role of the analogy is 
completely out of place. It could be argued, with some legitimacy, that here the role of the analogical 
barely has any relevance, that the characterization of History and its succession in Turgot, through a 
rationalist explanation of Providence, essentially refers to the evidence of successions, to the 
configuration of events through a cyclical pattern. It could be said, also, that here there is no theoretical 
framework at all that gives evidence of the historicity of events. It could be conceded with relative ease. 
Nevertheless, insofar as Turgot looks to the moral perfecting of nations (the notion of “Progress” had 
not yet acquired the semantic field of temporal historical vector), the reference to the singularities of 
History (despite all its regularities) ends up having a place in his discourse, however minimal: “Une 
combinaison continuelle de ses progrès avec les passions et avec les événements qu'elles ont produits, 
forme l'Histoire du genre humain, où chaque homme n'est plus qu'une partie d'un tout immense qui a, 
comme lui, son enfance et ses progres” (“A continual combination of this progress with the passions, 
and with the events they have caused, constitutes the history of the human race, in which each man is 
no more than one part of an immense whole which has, like him, its infancy and its advancement)  
(Turgot 276). Inasmuch as natural history affects the history of man, the discontinuities between Order 
and History cease to be so clear.  
If the case of Turgot obliges us to rethink the abyss between modes of enunciation of knowledge, 
Vico’s New Science goes further. He begins from a familiar human finitude that at the same time aims 
to attain the universality typical of all metaphysics. The field to which he applies it is the course of 
nations and their political, religious and cultural development. It is not necessarily about seeing Vico as 
the father of historicism, although the specialist literature pictures him thus (Cacciatore 26-34). But 
what is evident in his texts is the indecision between the imposition of a legal order that guarantees 
stability and the perseverance/consistency of the singularity of each period. In this regard, he shifts 
precisely between the two spheres. I quote one of the final texts of his major work, where this tension 
can be discerned: “Oggi una compiuta umanità sembra essere sparsa per tutte le nazioni, poiché pochi 
grandi monarchi reggono questo mondo di popoli; e, se ve n’hanno ancor barbari, egli n’è cagione perché 
le loro monarchie hanno durato sopra la sapienza volgare di religioni fantastiche e fiere”  (“Today a 
complete humanity seems to be spread abroad through all nations, for a few great monarchs rule over 
this world of peoples. If there are still some barbarous peoples surviving, it is because their monarchies 
have persisted in the vulgar wisdom of imaginative and cruel religion”) (Vico 954). The elements that 
come into play are more than varied: circumscription of the regularity of socio-political practices 
depending on the metaphysical models of religion; regularity of the course of nations that pays no 
attention to an outline extrinsic to the very future of peoples (the coexistence of different models of 
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nations collides head-on with a kind of historical regularity superior to each particular development); 
configuration of humanity based on their own historical and cultural legacy; moral and legal progress 
dependent on suitable monarchic models. All these elements, joined together, are too diverse to be able 
to bind them into a classic Foucauldian episteme or other modern episteme. What this text shows is 
exactly the sphere of continuity between both models – although this continuity should not allow any 
totalization, but rather points to a blind spot that is characteristic of Modernity: indecision regarding the 
role of authority in carrying out social justice. This is otherwise a typical subject of the revolutionary 
bourgeois philosophies of history.  
More characteristic of the philosophies of history (particularly after the French Revolution) is the 
construction of narratives about freedom, which is the way in which the tension is resolved between 
authority and the implementation of certain historically won rights. And just here, where Foucault 
criticizes this conception, he moves closer precisely to the very indecision of the first theorists on the 
philosophy of history:  
 
We should not think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realized over time, or which undergoes 
quantitative variations, greater or lesser drastic reductions, or more or less important periods of eclipse. It is 
not a universal which is particularized in time and geography. Freedom is not a white surface with more or 
less numerous black spaces here and there and from time to time. Freedom is never anything other –but this 
is already a great deal– than an actual relation between governors and governed, a relation in which the 
measure of the “too little” existing freedom is given by the “even more” freedom demanded. (Foucault, Birth 
63) 
 
It is not possible to speak of an exterior freedom as such. Neither does it make sense to conceive this 
freedom as intrinsic, essential, as an anthropological constant. Wherever there is freedom, it is freedom 
in a context. And from the eighteenth century, they begin to consider how, through based on the 
apparatuses of the conduct typical of governmentality (Gros et al. 18). Contextualizing this topic of 
individual freedom and political freedom: progress and globalization are spoken of as more or less 
explicit processes that operate from the eighteenth century onwards, which entail a breaking of the 
politics of the balance of power of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This freedom that is 
demanded, furthermore, is made difficult to conceive in strong teleological terms: it does not pre-exist 
its relations of force of the political (that this exists in authors such as Vico through the concept of 
“providence” is subject to debate, in which I lean towards the negative). However, the concept of 
freedom, which together with being a crystallization of different discourses and enunciations, together 
with being an effect, is set forth in the first philosophical-historical discourses (Vico, Montesquieu) as a 
kind of ideological signifier that articulates and legitimizes the demands themselves of the political in 
the (desired) stability of the present and its future ramifications. It is thus articulated as a vector and 
promotor of the action at the heart of society. And this form of articulation refers to the ratification of 
the political correction of its present. Deep down, but also in the superficial effects that can be seen in 
Vico and Turgot, all explanation of history is a narrative that justifies the particularities of the present, 
although their legitimation is raised to the universal plane. Every enunciation that is made of freedom 
has to pass through a discourse that cannot completely escape from its ideological tenor – a discourse 
that, in order to be effective, must obliterate the conditions of it construction in the enunciation of its 
narrative.        
By way of conclusion, I will set down some of the key points dealt with in this article. Perhaps one of 
the fundamental problems that underlies Society Must Be Defended is the question of up to what point 
the praise for the discourses of counter-history is the praise for the possibility of opening a path from 
narrative to political mobilization. The order of discourse, in the Foucauldian political project, requires 
three pillars: an archaeology that shows the relations among the knowledge of a period, a genealogy 
that refers the interrelation of such knowledge to our present interests, and an attitude that succeeds 
in doing politics (Revel, Foucault avec Merleua-Ponty 38). But, with all that, it is difficult for these three 
elements to remain confined to the differential thresholds of hegemonic knowledge. The appearance of 
Boulainvilliers’s narratives about the origins shows a counter-knowledge that, to his regret, would suffer 
the fate of having his grievances being reabsorbed into the heart of the discursive structure of the State. 
Suffice it to think, on the plane of cultural representations, about the change in ideological meaning that 
was made of the paintings by Jean-Louis David in revolutionary France: divergent uses are given to the 
same object through a process of reappropriation that are not at all ingenuous. It is a question of 
demanding the right of interpretation. It is about introducing, in the circuit of ideology, the legal 
assumption of the truth. Stated another way: the truth, true historical interpretation, has a legitimate 
owner. And when legitimacy triumphs, legality and asymmetry of power returns. Tragically, all 
crystallized discourse on history will be a discourse that has swallowed up the counter-knowledge that 
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forged its practical, revolutionary nature. An unattainable History comes into play here, an awareness 
of temporality and of its critical, political aspect, which has no wish to be reduced to episteme but which 
cannot yet find an exit in the form of knowledge either. The characterization of the episteme “History” 
assumed in the modern era cannot therefore be of value: Foucault, conscious of its possible (and 
unwanted) translation to Weltanschaaung, gradually redirects this episteme to the field of enunciations 
(Van de Wiele 606). The main focus is choosing the narratives that will attempt to produce a History 
from the stories. But, insofar as it is proposed to create a genealogy of the conflict based on the 
narratives about history, the archaeological project requires certain revision – to be specific, a revision 
of the role of the pre-revolutionary philosophies of history. 
All narrative about History, outlined and contemplated out of finite and specific knowledge, will 
obsessively seek identification between the particular and the universal in cultural productions. The 
philosophy of history attempted it, generally in vain when it became very technical, through concepts 
such as “freedom” or “nation.” But its range of action was minimal in practice, at least in comparison 
with the apparatuses of the knowledge inherent to the peak of liberalism. We must not forget that we 
find ourselves at the heart of the discourse, of a discourse that had not yet experienced, in the mid-
eighteenth century, the nature of proclamation, of pronunciamiento or of manifesto. Therefore, the task 
remaining is its examination as ideology. In other words, as critical practice in the heart of the discourses 
that does not end up annulling those other discourses over which it operates. And, speaking of 
annulment, it is not enough to refer only to censure, to the deletion of the record. Along with the 
discourse, there is the extralinguistic element that is violence. What needs to be done is to stop 
observing it as what is radically different from language, knowledge, reason. The non-opposition 
between reason and violence is patent in the domain of Foucault’s discourse (Gros 75-76), but the 
question points to another aspect: whether it is at all possible to understand the imbalances between 
the theoretical and the practical in the knowledge-power apparatuses. The question that arises, if 
explaining it as a kind of dilemma has any usefulness, is whether that discourse can be understood by 
reference to something not textual and practical or if it is merely a space of justification of some already 
determined expository conditions. If it can, or can’t, produce event, and other event – an “experience” 
in the sense of the make-up of subjectivities that resist (Morey 174-75) by means of the text. Raising 
this question does not necessitate the reabsorption of the Foucauldian project in the universalizing 
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